Supercomputers are becoming necessary tools as researchers advance the limits of computational science. For the academic community, the costs associated with buying and maintaining supercomputers are large enough to necessitate making them shared resources to which numerous scientists are connected by networks. Because there are benefits to sharing information among users located at remote sites, networks have been developed to link researchers around the world.
The positive impact of sharing supercomputers and the Information they produce has been demonstrated, and the case for continuing the growth of computational science has been made repeatedly. Recent events have focused attention on the need to secure properly the privacy and integrity of data held within these shared resources. In particular, the community of supercomputer users must decide the appropriate balance between dependence on technological security measures and reliance on the ethical behavior of colleagues sharing access to the tools and communications systems on which we depend. As with other security systems, the balance should be based on an analysis of the risks involved in a compromise of the security and the requirements of the community to share information readily, without excessive interference by security measures.
As participants in a technologically advanced society, we accept certain compromises in order to balance the costs of resources with the benefits derived from them. For example, few of us can afford the costs or time required to maintain a comprehensive professional library. We therefore accept the merit of constructing a central library and sharing its contents. When we travel by airplane, most of us select a common carrier rather than providing personal solutions. In many instances sharing a common resource infringes on both our privacy and our ability to control our own environ-ment, even as it provides benefits that otherwise would be exceedingly more difficult to achieve. Our willingness to engage in such social contracts depends on our perception of the costbenefit ratio, and the risks associated with utili~ing shared resources.
In each of the preceding examples, we depend on the maintainers of the shared resource to protect it sufficiently ; the definition of sufficient varies markedly, however, with what is considered to be at risk. Whenever we share resources, we also depend on the integrity and ethical behavior of those with whom we share; the total security provided, and the relative weights placed on personal responsibility and system control functions, typically are based on an assessment of the number, type, and severity of the risks that exist for damage. Library security permits access only to legitimate patrons and denies the surreptitious removal of material to the best of its ability. Within a library, the security of its contents depends primarily on the responsible behavior of the patrons who were granted access. Airline security relies, with good reason, much more on externally imposed safety measures than on the responsibility and ethical behavior of individuals. We therefore submit to electronic screenings, among other invasive measures, in order to ensure the safest flights possible.
Wherein then lies supercomputer security?
A typical user of supercomputers might respond that security is a necessary evil that has its place. That place is probably to serve as an invisible shield -not causing an otherwise friendly system to become unfriendly, not consuming excessive resources, and yet protecting the privacy and integrity of stored data. Although this is a perhaps laudable ideal, it is an unlikely reality. The networks that link computational scientists are, by design, readily accessible to a spectrum of users. This design feature makes the networks and the computers connected to them vulnerable to attack by individuals or groups with various motivations. Probably the most frequent type of attack is by hackers, whose main interest is in proving that they can circumvent security measures and break into systems at will. This past fall, the computing community was treated, through what some have charitably referred to as an act of malicious mischief, to a powerful demonstration of what can happen when computer security fails. There are many lessons to be learned from the late-October episode, which was initiated by a graduate student who, like other hackers who invade systems to which they have not been granted access, apparently wanted to test his ability to elude security checks in computer systems connected to a public network. For the computing community, the lessons range from the need for increased attention to the technical aspects of computer security to the requirement for teaching ethics to a generation of students emerging into an academic world connected by shared resources.
My informal poll of computing professionals, taken in an attempt to gauge reactions to the incident that brought significant portions of the national research network and associated components to a screeching halt, indicated that initial knee-jerk reactions ran the gamut. There were those who praised the student's ingenious attack on a huge system-creating in him a folk hero of sorts-and others who castigated him as a criminal who should be prosecuted to the limits of the law. (The severity of the reaction tended to be directly proportional to the proximity of the commentator to the problems caused by the student.)
More measured responses have emerged as the debate has continued, with both extreme positions moving to a more central and perhaps higher ground: &dquo;The student used bad judgment and probably through an error caused more damage than he intended.&dquo; &dquo;There were known holes in the security of the systems attacked, and installations providing supercomputer services have a responsibility to make the systems as secure as possible.&dquo; &dquo;It's not clear that there are laws to cover this situation even if there were a decision to prosecute.&dquo; &dquo;Perhaps a service was done in that problems were made evident by someone who did not intend, by all indications, to wreak havoc and destroy data on the systems he invaded.&dquo;
Conservative estimates of the cost associated with this prank are in the millions of dollars. In numerous installations, teams of systems programmers worked around the clock to eradicate the worm from their pieces of the network. Moreover, because the systems were dosed down, many researchers lost productive time on the machines that were affected. There is no way in which the mischief that, once out of control, caused so much harm can be considered laudable. All of us will lose if we allow this incident to melt away unnoticed and without serious reprimand. It is evident that known security problems should be fixed. It is also critical that computer security be elevated to a priority position when allocating research and development funds for supercomputing environ-ments. Security experts should be encouraged to work toward technical solutions for protecting the privacy of data that must exist on shared resources, and once developed, the solutions should be implemented wherever possible. Users who believe they have found means to bypass security systems can help the community by including security teams in any effort to demonstrate system security flaws.
No network of shared resources will ever be impenetrable, regardless of the degree of focus and attention the security problem receives. We cannot delude ourselves that there could be a perfect solution-other than the extreme of eliminating all networks and all sharing of resources. This extreme, although it has some champions, carries its own set of penalties. All of us depend on access to shared resources and to efficient and effective communications networks to increase our ability to work cooperatively with our peers.
The reasonable approach is to pursue a two-pronged attack on the problem. From one direction, we must encourage the development and implementation of sound security procedures. From the other, we must address actively the ethical issues associated with sharing access to national resources. Abuse of the privilege of access certainly should not be praised, but rather, in a measured way, should be met with appropriate punishments. We cannot, as a community, afford to close down our communications links, or turn them over to hackers. Ignoring or idolizing the actions of even the most ingenious attacker leaves the community at risk.
